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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TELEVISION
BROADCASTING BY SATELLITE
Monroe E. Price*
Some questions are better left unasked; the peril of finding out
the true answer is too great. One such question is whether people
within the United States have the right, free of governmental re-
straints, to receive speech from abroad and to send speech to those
outside the nation's boundaries. At first blush, the issue seems a
simple one. But an examination of existing government behavior
and first amendment theory forecloses simple solutions. The diffi-
culty has become clear to the United States Department of State as
it joins in a late and little known round of debate about the
amendment and international control over the direct broadcast
satellite.' Many nations have called for international limits on the
content of direct satellite broadcasts and for national consent be-
fore a signal could be purposely beamed at a state.2 American
representatives to international organizations at first urged that the
proposed restraints violate domestic constitutional requirements of
freedom of speech and press.8 Without totally abandoning that
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; B.A. 1960,
L.L.B. 1964, Yale University. I wish to thank Professor Abram Chayes and
Messrs. Paul Laskin and J. L. Hargrove, among others, for their assistance.
Much of the research for this Article was done for a Committee of the American
Society of International Law.
1 For an early comment, see Ruddy, American Constitutional Law and Re-
strictions on the Content of Private International Broadcasting, 5 INT'L LAW. 102
(1971); Straschnov, Comments on the Draft Convention Against Unauthorized
Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellites, 19 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF U.S. 429 (1972). Many of the issues are also treated in
ASPEN INSTITUTE PROGRAM ON COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY, CONTROL OF THE
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES IN CONFLICT (1974) [hereinafter cited
as ASPEN INSTITUTE].
2 See G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 14, U.N. Doe. A
2916 (1972) [hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 2916]. See also Draft Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of
Information[,] the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange,
UNESCO Doc. 17 C/76 (1972).
3 See, e.g., Ruddy, supra note 1 (Mr. Ruddy was then Assistant General
Counsel of the United States Information Agency). The hard-line position was
most toughly stated by Frank Stanton (former president of Columbia Broadcast-
ing System):
Regardless of what body exercises the power of the censor, the
effect of both the Soviet Union draft and the UNESCO draft is to
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posture, the United States has perceptibly altered its position
after a lonely isolation on the issue. The international com-
munity is now urged to adopt a declaration of principles rather
than a binding convention that would have the force of law.4 But
even as these principles are in the process of being drafted, the
United States has had trouble preventing international positions
that conflict with the free flow of information. 5
American representatives are to be commended for urging
standards for the international community which, on analysis, are
closer to the ideal than the record of the United States. A divorce
between goal and reality is not unusual, and a first amendment of
the temple6 rather than of the marketplace is to be preferred.7 But
the reality of first amendment practice lurks in the background, an
uninvited guest in the elegant halls of international discourse. In
shaping a set of international principles, foreign states may appro-
priately inquire into the pattern of United States government re-
straints on information coming from abroad or on programs violat-
ing certain content standards.
I.
A. The Impact of Satellite Broadcasting
To understand the relevance of the American experience in
the regulation of televised and other speech, it is important to have
a sense of the issues raised by the direct broadcast satellite. A di-
rect broadcast satellite, like the current generation of communica-
tions satellites, will hang in geostationary orbit, appearing to take a
fixed position with respect to earth." There is vigorous debate
make it possible for every signatory government to assert control over
the content of international broadcasts. Quite seriously, I do not seehow our government, given our Constitution, can possibly enter into any
agreement in which the rights of Americans to speak to whomever they
please when they please are bartered away. And that is what both draft
documents would do.
Speech at WREC Fiftieth Anniversary Ceremonies, Memphis, Oct. 4, 1972.
4 See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the Legal
Sub-committee, U.N. Doe. A/AC. 105/147, at 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Legal Sub-committee Report].
5 See text accompanying notes 29-38 infra.6 See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, in 1961
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 245 (Kurland ed.).
7 See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1076 (1973); Anthony, Towards
Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast License Proceedings, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
429 (1971).
8 There is an abundance of material on the technology and policy imple-
mentations of direct broadcast satellites. See, e.g., Chayes & Chazen, Policy
Problems in Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STui. 4 (1970).
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about the pace at which direct broadcast satellite technology will
mature. Less subject to question is the structure of the resulting
system.' ° The satellite is merely a transmitter of signals which it
sends to receiving stations or antennas on earth. At present, these
earth stations must be enormously powerful because the transmit-
ting power of the current generation of satellites is relatively low.
Earth stations are expensive, and the result is that the satellite, under
current enginering, is used primarily for point-to-point communica-
tion where the cost of satellite transmission is lower than the cost of
transmission via terrestrial long-line cable. 1 Modest advances in
technology will alter this pattern. Already, the United States has
experimented with a satellite designed to bring service to commu-
nity receivers in the Rocky Mountain states, and the same satellite
is being used to transmit to approximately 5,000 villages in India.12
From the community receiver, the next step is a receiver in the
home, taking signals directly from the satellite with no intervening
community, regional or national control point where the incoming
signals could be monitored and filtered.
In its final flower, the direct broadcast satellite undoubtedly
will be a potent instrument for reaching across national borders to
transmit information, education, cultural events and commer-
cials."3 It is hailed as a new device for binding the world
together and serving the cause of peace. 4 But its coming is also
feared. The satellite is seen as another step in a kind of informa-
tion imperialism leading to substantial control, whether intentional
or not, over the less developed countries through direct media
access to community centers or individual homes from sources in
the major developed nations.' 5
9 Compare Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report of the
Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/127 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Working Group Report], with de Sola Pool, Direct Broad-
cast Satellites and the Integrity of National Cultures, in ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra
note 1, at 27. Dr. Pool states that "there is no imminent prospect of direct
satellite TV broadcasts to countries that do not wish to receive them." Id. The
Report states that "Japan was planning to launch a medium-size experimental
broadcast satellite in 1976 or 1977 .... ." Working Group Report, supra at 7.
10 See, e.g., Dugmore, The Newest Frontier in Communications: The Direct
Broadcast Satellite, 13 JAG L. REv. 259 (1971).
11 See generally AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAw, DrwEcr BROADCASTING FROM
SATELLITES: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 3-7 (1975).
12 Id. at 5.
13 The international law status of national mechanisms for the control of
information flowing across state borders is beyond the scope of this Article. Two
interesting essays are available: Hargrove, International Law and the Case for
Cultural Protectionism, in ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 85; Buergenthal,
The Right to Receive Information Across National Boundaries, in id. at 73.
14 See, e.g., remarks of Sulwyn Lewis, quoted in ASPEN INSTTrrUTE, supra
note 1, at 37.
15 See de Sola Pool, supra note 9, at 27-33.
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With its potential ability to reach into homes with ease, the
direct broadcast satellite expands the opportunity for the free flow
of information. But it can also disrupt the delicate techniques now
used to balance the inward flow of information against the need to
preserve and enhance national identity. In some cases, the govern-
ments may be concerned that the information and views that
directly reach the people will lead to greater political opposition.
Some governments fear the impact of Soviet information and prop-
aganda. Others may fear ideas and information coming from the
United States. Some envision a future in which two systems of
direct broadcast satellites, each dominated by a superpower, rain
signals on the nations within their sway. Another concern is the
lack of a genuine exchange among the nations. The principle of
free flow of information would be more palatable if it were not
unidirectional or almost so.16 The less developed countries are
media poor and information poor, in the Western sense. Each
piece of external information takes on great significance. Often
the nations are only recently independent. They yearn to develop
their own political and national identity. Control over communi-
cations is a way to reach that goal; foreign-source information is an
obstacle.
Economic motives may also prompt regulation of the interna-
tional flow of information. Perhaps eighty percent of the nations
have government or monopoly television systems."l Even in na-
tions with more than one system, such as the United States, existing
distributors of television signals bear public interest responsibilities.
In the United States, for example, there are quasi-duties to provide
news and information in a balanced fashion,'" to behave in a way
that enhances the electoral process,' 9 to refrain from programming
that is unsuitable for children or could be classified as obscene, 20
and to provide service on an equitable basis throughout the coun-
try, serving rural and urban areas alike." Unregulated entry of
direct broadcast satellite signals could pose a threat to the econom-
ic structure that underpins the sanctioned system for distributing
television signals. 22
16 See, e.g., B. PAULU, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING ON THE EURO-
PEAN CONTINENT 150, 208-09, 214-16 (1967); W. DizzARD, TELEVISION-A
WORLD VIEW 155-78 (1966).
17 See, e.g., B. PAULU, supra note 16, at 52-89.
18 Cf., e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 399 (1970).
'9 Id. § 315; cf. Comment, Right of Access to the Broadcast Media ]oi
Paid Editorial Advertising-A Plea to Congress, 22 UCLA L. REv. 258 (1974).
20 See notes 105-07 & accompanying text infra.
21 Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 73.30 (1973). The validity of these restrictions and
burdens is mildly open to question as a result of several recent Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
22 In Canada, the debate over American signals on cable systems has
882 [Vol. 23: 879
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B. The International Response
These international concerns found a focus in August 1972,
when the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations General
Assembly a draft international convention calling for strict con-
trols over satellite broadcasting.2" The Soviet proposals, which
were warmly received, would have imposed a consent requirement
and would have considerably limited the content of the messages
that could be transmitted via satellite. Article III of the Soviet
Draft Convention specified the permissible uses of the satellite: "en-
hancing the educational level of the population, developing culture
and expanding international exchanges in the fields of science, cul-
ture and sport."24  Forbidden purposes were listed in Articles IV
and VI. A later draft provided that states would agree to exclude
material which
publicizes ideas of war, militarism, national and racial hatred
and enmity between peoples, which is aimed at interfering in
the internal domestic affairs of other States, or which under-
mines the foundations of the local civilizatition [sic], culture,
way of life, traditions or language.2 5
In the following months this proposal was debated heatedly, and
in November 1972, the General Assembly voted to refer the matter
to its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 6 The
resolution recited both the potential benefits of satellite broadcast-
ing and the need to respect the sovereignty of states in its use, and
raised these issues; they also lurked in the background of the pirate station con-
troversies of the 1960's. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
23 U.N. Doe. A/8771 (1972).
24 Id. at 5.
25 U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/127 (1974) Annex II, at 2. The 1972 draft of
Article VI listed six categories of broadcasts for which international liability
could be incurred:
(a) Broadcasts detrimental to the maintenance of international peace
and security;
(b) Broadcasts representing interference in intra-State conflicts of any
kind;
(c) Broadcasts involving an encroachment on fundamental human
rights, on the dignity and worth of the human person and on fun-
damental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion;
(d) Broadcasts propagandizing violence, horrors, pornography and the
use of narcotics;
(e) Broadcasts undermining foundations of the local civilization, cul-
ture, way of life, traditions or language;
(f) Broadcasts which misinform the public on these or other matters.
U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972) at 6. Parts (a), (b) & (e) were incorporated
in Article IV of the 1974 version; the remaining provisions were dropped, as was
a prohibition of programming "immoral or instigating in nature." U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/127 (1974) Annex II, at 5.
26 G.A. Res. 2916, supra note 2. See also Report of the First Committee
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/8864 (1972). For a brief history of the
Soviet initiative, see Symposium, The Control of Program Content in International
Telecommunications, 13 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15 n.29 (1974).
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it requested the Outer Space Committee "to elaborate principles
governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct
television broadcasting with a view to concluding an international
agreement or agreements. '2 7  The United States, standing on a
priestly view of the first amendment, cast the only vote against this
resolution.28
The United States' initial reaction can easily be understood.
The list of prohibitions submitted by the USSR was a first amend-
ment chamber of horrors. But the extreme American stand was
difficult to justify. It did not adequately reflect a sensitivity to the
concerns of other countries over the one-way flow of information
and programming, and it did not fully reflect an intricate sense of
domestic first amendment practices. The harm of an unproduc-
tive, isolated position led to a good deal of discussion and self-
examination on the issue between 1972 and 1974.29 As a result,
the American stance has been tempered.
The forum for this change has been the Legal Sub-committee
of the General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, the Working Group of which completed its report in
March 1975.30 Since the Working Group operates by consensus,
its product where there is no dissent reflects a position to which the
United States currently assents.31
The report, by stating alternative positions where no consen-
sus could be reached, also identifies specific differences among the
various nations. It is organized in a way that highlights the
remaining free expression concerns of the United States. The
document proceeds principle by principle, the text showing the
struggle for consensus. For example, in the first principle, "Pur-
poses and Objectives," one important area of disagreement rests in
how the function of satellite broadcasting should be described and
limited in conforming the satellite's uses to certain international
goals.3 2  The document expresses differences of approach: Con-
sistent with the first amendment, the United States would assent to
a principle which would recognize that direct television broadcast-
27 G.A. Res. 2916, supra note 2.
28 27 U.N. GAOR 2081, at 6 (1972). A more charitable view of the
United States' action would be that it has traditionally favored less formal ap-
proaches to the resolution of disputes that have only potential significance. The
General Assembly's action, in part, was a triumph of the legalistic approach in
the French tradition over the common law penchant for evolution of rules.
29 See, e.g., Symposium, The Control of Program Content in International
Telecommunications, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 passim (1974).
30 Legal Sub-committee Report, supra note 4.
31 The most important aspect of the position is its emphasis on elaborating
principles, rather than drafting a convention (which would be legally binding).
82 Legal Sub-committee Report, supra note 4, Annex II, at 1-2.
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ing should "facilitate and expand the mutual international ex-
change of information and ideas."33  Other laudable objectives
would also be recognized. But should such a set of objectives be
hortatory or binding? Some members of the Working Group
insisted that the objectives provide a governing standard for all
direct television broadcasting, that "activities in the field of direct
television broadcasting by satellite shall be carried out by states
exclusively in a manner compatible with the . . . [stated] ob-
jectives . . . ."' For the United States, a closed-ended state-
ment of exclusive purposes ought to pose first amendment difficul-
ties.3 5
A second area where the Working Group produced alterna-
tives that expose the first amendment differences involves the issue
of national consent at the receiving end. The alternatives are as
follows:
Alternative A
Direct television broadcasting by means of artificial earth
satellites specifically aimed at a foreign State shall require
the consent of that State. The consenting State shall have
the right to participate in activities which involve coverage
of territory under its jurisdiction. This participation shall be
governed by appropriate arrangements between the States
involved.
Alternative B
Direct television broadcasting by satellite should be con-
ducted in accordance with the principles set out herein, and
in particular in accordance with principle . . . [which relates
to participation and cooperation]. It may be subject to such
restrictions imposed by the State carrying out or authorizing
it as are compatible with the generally accepted rules of in-
ternational law relating to freedom of expression, which
includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.
The consent of any State in which such broadcasting is
received is not required, but the State carrying it out or autho-
rizing it should consult fully with any such receiving State
which so requests concerning any restrictions to be imposed
by 'the former State.
33 Id. at 2 (Alternative B).
34 Id. (Alternative A).
35 This problem is linked to a second-the extent to which the federal gov-
ernment can take responsibility for programs that emanate from the United States.
The American alternative principle does not restrict the kind of entity that may
engage in direct television broadcasting. The opposing draft principle mandates
that "activities in the field of direct television broadcasting by satellites shall be
carried out by States .... ." Id. Such a principle might be inconsistent with the
licensing of commercial television organizations such as the networks.
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The foregoing is without prejudice to -the restrictions
which may be imposed in accordance with international law
on technical grounds.86
Alternative B, to which the United States would painlessly adhere,
avoids internationally sanctioned compulsory compliance with cen-
sorship standards. The principle would not necessarily require con-
sent of a state even if a signal is beamed directly at it. Quite rightly,
there is a considerable American fear that acceptance of a consent
formula implies acquiescence by the United States in the severely
limited broadcasting rules of many prospective receiving states.
The principle marks a recognition by the United States that certain
restrictions imposed by the receiving, state might be compatible
with principles of international law and acceptable under a first
amendment regime, but this is far from the exporter of information
accepting national restraints unilaterally imposed by the country
of import.
In terms of content regulation, the Working Group also failed
to reach a consensus. For -program content, the report of the
Working Group of the Legal Sub-committee stated three alternate
principles:
[States or their broadcasting entities which participate
in direct television broadcasting by satellite with other States
should co-operate with one another in respect of program-
ming, programme content, production and interchange of
programmes.]
[The broadcasting of commercial advertising, direct or
indirect to countries other than the country of origin, should
be on the basis of appropriate agreements between the coun-
tries concerned.]
[Notwithstanding the foregoing States undertaking activi-
ties in direct television broadcasting by satellites should in all
cases exclude from the television programmes any material
which is detrimental to the maintenance of international peace
and security, which publicizes ideas of war, militarism, na-
tional and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, which
is aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of other States
or which undermines the foundations of the local civilization,
culture, way of life, traditions or language.]37
The first alternative states the optimal position for free flow of
inforn jtion from the American perspective-a "soft" requirement
for consultation among states on issues relating to program con-
tent. The last alternative, with its defined code of program stan-
dards, adopts the view urged by the Soviet Union with much
accord in 1972.38
36 Id. at 3-4.
37 Id. at 4.
38 See U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972) at 5-6. See also text accompanying notes




Is there any historical explanation-aside from the first
amendment-for the gulf between the American view on direct
television broadcasting and the stance of other nations? Perhaps
one reason for the American position is that, for most of its 200
years, this nation has been spared the anguish and fear that comes
from a sense that its culture is controlled from abroad. In the
television and radio era, though the United States has had few if
any barriers to foreign programming, the percentage of externally
produced presentations on the American screen is among the low-
est in the world.39 Several non-legal facts account for the over-
whelming American-ness of domestic television programming.
Central is the structure of the industry and the way programming
decisions are made. American television acquires an audience
through programming and subsequently sells the audience to ad-
vertisers. The foreign nature of imported programming is al-
most always inconsistent with the audience maximization demand-
ed by this approach. The size of the United States and its
linguistic isolation also account for the absence of foreign program-
ming. Finally, the tradition of American fare has itself become a
formidable barrier to entry.
Since the American audience has not been inundated with
foreign programming, the need for and constitutional permissibility
of federal regulation of excessive foreign cultural influences have
not been tested. In first amendment terms, there is no compelling
or substantial governmental interest in abridging foreign program-
ming which has little or no effect on the American national
identity. But is it true that the inward flow of information could
not be curtailed under any circumstances? Only if this is true can
the United States properly and forcefully assert in an international
forum that the first amendment precludes American accession to a
convention legitimating the principle of national consent. An
international rule cannot be advocated on the basis of the present
state of facts in the United States. However, it is possible to imag-
ine a time when the United States has lost its preeminent position in
the packaging and export of information and entertainment. If the
volume of programming from abroad increased substantially, the
effect on the political system, on jobs, on media structure, and on
values might be the subject of legislative inquiry.40 Here, the expe-
39 See B. PAULtJ, supra note 16; W. DizzARD, supra note 16.
40 There were tremors, though light ones, when BBC exports began to ap-
pear in significant number on public broadcasting outlets. Congressional funds,
it was argued, should not be used to support British as opposed to American ac-
tors. Much the same problem arose in the 1960's when distinguished actors from
abroad sought labor permits to appear in Broadway productions. Cf. NAIPTD
v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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rience of other nations can be useful, for unlike the United States
they have felt the sting of unwanted foreign programming. The
issues are not exclusive to direct broadcast satellites. Nations have
been concerned, throughout the broadcast era, with the cultural,
economic, and political hazards of international terrestrial commu-
nication. International agreements have been sensitive to the im-
portance of national sovereignty; and states have restricted the
domestic broadcast of programs originating in other countries and
other cultures. 4
The clearest examples of national concern are created by
external interference with carefully thought-out domestic commu-
nications policies. An instructive incident in European frequency
management grew out of the effort of Radio Luxembourg and
similar continental commercial stations to capture a significant part
of the BBC's English audience.42 The Ullswater Committee, spe-
cially appointed in Great Britain in the 1930's to review policies
relating to the BBC, concluded:
[T]he practice of excluding advertisements from broadcast
programmes in this country is to the advantage of listeners
.... In recent years, however, this policy has been contra-
vened, and the purposes sought by the unified control of
broadcasting have been infringed by the transmission of ad-
vertisements in English from certain stations abroad which are
not subject to the influence of the British authorities except
by way of international agreement and negotiations. 43
Those who had been granted the broadcasting concessions in Lux-
embourg "expressly and frankly confessed that their main object
was to broadcast advertising programmes to neighboring countries,
particularly those which do not allow advertising in their own
national programmes."44  A series of protests to the International
Broadcasting Union (IBU) and the government of Luxembourg
were unavailing.4 5 In Britain the threat of Radio Luxembourg
was aggravated by the rise of wire relay exchanges. As with the
growth of cable television today, relay exchanges in the 1930's
offered to listeners a choice of broadcast stations they could not
receive unaided,46 and foreign systems were a likely source of
program augmentation.47
41 See G. CODDING, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION: AN
EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 116-30 (1952).
42 2 A. BRIGGS, HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: THE
GOLDEN AGE OF WIRELESS 339-69 (1970).
43 Id. at 350.
44 Id. at 354-55.
45 id. at 355.
46 Id. at 357.
47 In 1931, the BBC reached agreement with two of the largest relay ex-
change companies that in return for certain service from the BBC, the relay ex-
changes would rediffuse only BBC programs. Id. at 359. The agreement was
[Vol. 23: 879
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Finally, in May 1933, the Council of the IBU passed two
important resolutions. First, the Council resolved that
the systematic diffusion of programmes or messages, which
are specifically intended for listeners in another country and
which have been the object of a protest by the broadcasting
organisation of that country, constitutes an "inadmissible"
act from the point of view of good international relations.48
That resolution was directed at Radio Normandy. As to Radio
Luxembourg, the IBU Council stated that it
cannot sympathise with any type of programme which is essen-
tially based on the idea of commercial advertising in the in-
ternational field . . . . [Furthermore,] the transmission of
international programmes by a national organisation, which
has not been internationally recognised, might give rise to such
serious difficulties and disturb the good understanding be-
tween nations so profoundly that the transmission of such
programmes despite the absence of international recognition
must be considered by the Union as an "inadmissible" ele-
ment in European broadcasting. 49
It was, however, the war, and not international agencies, that
resolved the issue.5° Radio Luxembourg remained on the air until
two weeks after the outbreak of the war in 1939. 1
The case of nonlicensed stations broadcasting to Britain from
ships offshore during the early 1960's is also illustrative of a na-
tion's interest in preserving the integrity of its own licensed system.
British authorities were concerned with both the commercial com-
petition of the so-called "pirates" and the cultural implications of the
content of programming by those stations (primarily pop music).52
rendered unenforceable, however, because the Post Office refused to acquiesce in
it. Id.
48 Id. at 360.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 369. Though there was great difficulty in curtailing the power of
broadcasters to reach across national lines, there was an attempt to control the
freedom of listeners. In Germany, for example, a criminal statute provided for
five years' imprisonment for passing on "detrimental news" picked up from a
foreign station.- Id. at 366. See also Gower, Broadcasting in Germany, 162
SPECTATOR 294 (1939), cited in A. BIcs, supra note 42, at 366 n.3. Briggs
states that the Germans also designed a "People's Receiving Set" designed to re-
ceive German stations only. In 1939 there were 3 million such sets in the
country. A. BIcs, supra note 42, at 366.
51 A. BRIOS, supra note 42, at 369.
52 The pirate ship episode is illustrative because it demonstrated again the
difficulty of seeking through the IBU and other international organizations the
extraterritorial enforcement of a national government's desire to prevent broad-
casting into its country. Ultimately Great Britain was obliged to pass the Marine
Broadcasting (Offences) Bill which made it a crime for any newspaper to pub-
lish information about the programs of pirate ships, for any person to deal or
trade or communicate in any way with the personnel of the pirate ships, or for
any British citizen to work on such a vessel. P. HARsS, WHEN PIRATES RuLED
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Another setting for government content control involves Can-
ada. Private cable systems have successfully captured American
broadcast station signals and delivered them to their customers.
Since cable in some Canadian cities, such as Vancouver, reaches
fifty percent of television households, many homes have a choice
between several American and several Canadian signals. As in
Great Britain, the government is concerned with both the cultural
implications and the commercial pressures resulting from viewers'
preference for non-Canadian television. The ability of local televi-
sion stations to survive has been thrown in doubt by the increased
foreign competition. Canada is now attempting to balance greater
viewer choice with the political, cultural and economic implications
for Canada. Some restrictions are placed on the amount of Ameri-
can programming that can be carried over cables. Other rules
permit American programs but permit or require substitution of
commercials by the Canadian re-transmitter.5 3 Canada has also
denied tax deduction rights for advertising placed in Canadian
editions of non-Canadian magazines (with several prominent
grandfathered exceptions) . 4  Here too, the effort was to "help
foster in Canadians a sense of themselves." 55
III.
Two approaches to direct television broadcasting pose the
most difficult first amendment problems: national consent (the
consent of the receiving country) and international program stan-
dards (the code approach). National consent is a relatively easier
issue. Why should it be an American constitutional concern wheth-
er citizens of other nations receive an unfiltered spectrum of infor-
mation? Indeed, American practice has already recognized, to some
extent, the kinds of comity concerns that are reflected in a national
consent rule.
Current regulations dealing with international mail are highly
relevant to the direct broadcasting satellite issue, since they indicate
mTE WAVES 140-64 (2d ed. 1968). The law extended British jurisdiction to such
pirate ships even if they were beyond the territorial limits. Id.
After the passage of the Marine Offences Act, the operator of Radio Caro-
line indicated that he was considering appealing to the European Commission for
Human Rights. Id. at 190. That body announced that Article 10 of the Commis-
sion's convention gave no ground for hope to the pirates. The convention stated
that "everyone shall have the right of freedom of expression . . . regardless of
frontiers." But it went on to say: "This shall not prevent states from requiring
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises." Id. See also
Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 769 (1968).
53 These developments are discussed in Johansen, The Canadian Radio-
Television Commission and the Canadianization of Broadcasting, 26 FED. COM.
B.J. 183 (1973).
54 Gotlieb, The Transnational Flow of Information: A Canadian Perspective,
68 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 127, 131 (1974).
55 Id. (quoting the 1972 report of the Davey Commission).
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some respect for principles of comity. The United States has
agreed, through the Universal Postal Union, to refuse to accept
"[m]atter addressed to foreign countries posted in violation of law or
treaty stipulation."56 The regulations also prohibit, in the domes-
tic mail,
[a]ny matter of a character tending to incite arson, murder,
assassination, treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to
any law of the United States, or containing any threat to take
the life of, or to inflict harm upon, the President of the United
States.
57
The mechanism for determining mailability is not wholly clear.
The postmaster, wheli a determination of nonmailability of a letter
or package is challenged, must submit a sample or a statement
of the facts to the Rates and Classifications Department and await
instructions.5" When the suspect material is "written, printed or
graphic matter," and its mailability is questioned, the Inspection
Service must be notified.59
Since the United States does not accept for mailing articles
prohibited in the receiving country, 60 it is useful to itemize some of
the formal prohibitions acknowledged by countries according to
the United States Postal Service. Argentina, for example, for-
bids "communist propaganda."61  Australia prohibits "[pirinted
matter considered by the Australian customs authorities as unduly
emphasizing crime, horror or sex, or having a depraving effect." 62
Many countries restrict the entry of exposed motion picture film
and broadcasting equipment. 63
56 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL SERVICE MANUAL § 123.44c
(1975). See also UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, INTERNATIONAL MAIL (1974):
"Packages known to contain articles prohibited in a country are not accepted for
mailing.". Id. § 312.31.
57 POSTAL SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 56, at § 123.44e.
58 Id. § 123.33.
59 Id. § 123.32.
60 INTERNATIONAL MAIL, supra note 56, at § 312.31.
61 Id. at appendix (alphabetic listing of countries).
62 Id.
C3 Such countries include Burma, China, U.S.S.R., Rumania. Id. Other
restrictions have a relation, though remote, to content. Indonesia, for example,
prohibits the entry of books and magazines printed in the Indonesian language
outside Indonesia unless the books are approved. Id. Hungary has quantitative
limits: No addressee can receive more than three each of books, magazines or
photographs. id. Korea attempts to restrict Postal Union Mail to material
addressed in one of seven languages. Id. The Soviet Union prohibits the import
of games and toys "of a militaristic nature." Id.
All these examples assume that the United States can constitutionally be
party to an international arrangement for the exchange of information where one
party-state reserves the right to censor; for aesthetic, if not constitutional, reasons,
it might be unpalatable for the United States to agree to take on the censoring
functions that each mail-receiving country reserves to itself. Under such a view,
the United States cannot agree that it will open mail destined for the Soviet
Union and refuse to expedite the offending letters to the gates of the receiving
country. The first amendment may prohibit the government from acting as
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Another font of regulation bearing on the direct broadcast
satellite is the perceived need to protect a regulated carrier of
information from unrestricted competition by a new entrant in the
spectrum. National consent may have such an anticompetitive
underpinning. Radio stations sought protection from television;
television sought protection from cable. Stations that had a mo-
nopoly in small markets obtained protection from new television
competition. The regulatory approach, one that has significant
content implications, is germane to the development of the direct
broadcast satellite because unrestricted satellite transmissions are
likely to eat away at the audience of domestically licensed television
stations.
This argument for regulation of satellite broadcasts is similar
to arguments made in the recent debates about the FCC's jurisdic-
tion over wired systems and over non-broadcast programming
originated by those systems. The FCC, which was at first wary of
extending its power, ultimately determined that it could assert its
authority. One argument that was convincing to both the FCC
and the United States Supreme Court was based on the competitive
nature of the cable television offering. Regulating broadcast tele-
vision would make little sense if the cable systems could play havoc
with the table of allocations, with the fairness doctrine, and with
countless other regulatory niceties. The Supreme Court, in two
cases,6 4 determined that the FCC had fairly extensive jurisdiction,
relying on the general language creating the FCC:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign com-
merce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
censor on behalf of countries that have the right to censor themselves. But what
if a different arrangement were conceived? Suppose the government of Argen-
tina said that, for efficiency's sake, they would like to station a censor in New
York who would go through all mail directed to Argentinians and conduct the
censorship operation on American soil. The government would do no more than
deliver the mail to the Argentinian who could, one supposes, be called "the post
office" of that country for purposes of appropriate legal delivery. Beyond this,
one could imagine a more sophisticated mechanism, where the screeners of infor-
mation are international civil servants with sufficient authority in their own stead
or as explicitly delegated agents of the censoring agencies in the receiving coun-
tries.
In the domestic satellite sphere, a similarly distasteful arrangement would
work as follows: The United States would require that broadcasts to persons
outside the United States originate from specified ground stations. Those ground
stations would be under the jurisdiction of international customs agents (or repre-
sentatives of the receiving countries). These officials would review the material
to determine whether it had been-accepted by the appropriate broadcasting organi-
zation or government entity in the receiving country. If the tape or message had
not been approved, other techniques would have to be pursued.
64 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service .... 65
The Court also relied on the language which provides that the Act
"shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio . . .which originates and/or is received within the United
States ... "66
In United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,6 7 a plurality of the
Court approved the FCC's regulatory goal: "to integrate the
CATV service into the national television structure in such a way
as to promote maximum television service to all people of the
United States ... ." This definition of authority went beyond
the clearest basis for decision in United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co.,69 namely the regulation of cable television to the extent
that it was reasonably ancillary to the regulation of broadcast
television.
Either of the above grounds for regulation might justify FCCjurisdiction over signals emanating from a direct broadcasting
satellite. The growth of such a transmission system would have a
substantial impact on the national television structure. Unregulat-
ed programs delivered by direct broadcast satellite could so impair
the market for terrestrial transmissions that traditional broadcast
licensees would be economically hindered in their capacity to serve
the public interest. Beyond that, the Commission might determine
that, as with the local origination requirement involved in cable,70
or the limits on film and sports on pay television, 71 some affirma-
tive obligations should be placed on direct satellite transmissions so
as to "promote maximum television service to all the people. ''72
Indeed, unless a treaty barred such FCC regulation, and unless
the Congress explicitly forbade the Commission from assertingjurisdiction over signals emanating from direct broadcast satellites,
it would be surprising if the FCC did not assert such power at some
time in the future.
What the FCC could do if it asserted jurisdiction is a difficult
question, and would turn, to some extent, on the powers open to a
state under the treaty or convention and, of course, on disputes
concerning the scope of the Communications Act of 1934. 71 If a
65 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
66 Id. § 152(a).
67 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
68 Id. at 666, quoting Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 745-46
(1966).
69 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
70 See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 652-56 (1972).
71 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975).
72 406 U.S. at 666.
73 47 U.S.C. passim (1970).
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"consent" regime were established, then FCC certification might
constitute the consent of the United States for a particular transmis-
sion. In the absence of such certification, the entity or individual
seeking access to an American audience would be prevented by the
manager of the foreign earth station from beaming his message to
this country.
The FCC might impose standards on persons who wished to
deliver signals via satellite. Under the regulatory analysis, it would
not be unconstitutional, for example, for the FCC to require that
all signals sent into the United States be delivered to a licensed
domestic sender, with the sender responsible for programming
under traditional license renewal theories. Or, as the FCC has
done with cable television, the Commission could impose obsceni-
ty, anti-lottery, and fairness doctrine standards on signals that
arrive via satellite. In addition, licensed broadcasters, like other
individuals, are subject to the criminal laws, including the rem-
nants of statutes prohibiting advocacy of insurrection, violent over-
throw of the government, or encouragement of riot. 74  A broad-
caster convicted of these crimes could be denied renewal of a
television license. Under the principle of equal treatment, the
FCC might seek to establish corresponding restrictions on the
content of signals that derive from outside the nation's borders.
There may be some doubt about the power of the United States so
to regulate activities that originate in another country, but the
better view is that such power exists under the objective territorial
principle of jurisdiction.7 5
Given all this precedent, a national consent provision is to be
preferred over explicit internationally sanctioned content restric-
tions. But even a relatively simple consent approach has first
amendment problems which may turn on the method of administra-
tion. If, under the international agreement, the United States is
required to screen the outgoing programs of American producers
(enforcing the "consent standards" of the receiving states), the
American programmer's right to speak has, at least arguably, been
unconstitutionally infringed. True, FCC regulations on interna-
tional broadcasters confine programming to material that reflects
favorably on American culture. Indeed, the government, through
the Voice of America, bypasses many censorship problems in inter-
national broadcasting by itself retaining the international frequen-
cies. By assigning to the Voice of America most of the frequency
hours available to the United States, the government can strictly
control program content. A consent standard that put the onus
74 See T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 97 & passim
(1970).
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 18 (1965).
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on the receiving country to police reception would pose the fewest
constitutional problems. Here the United States would be under
no obligation to police CBS or other private broadcasters who
sought access to the satellite to distribute their programs through-
out the world. A nation that opposed such broadcasts would itself
be required to police community reception facilities or television
receivers.76
Of course, a consent provision might be fashioned which
discriminates on the basis of the kind of programming transmitted.
In this context, various UNESCO recommendations 77 are interest-
ing. The UNESCO draft would distinguish among categories of
programming and would differentiate between the rights of indi-
viduals and the rights of states with respect to each category of
information. 78  As to news, the UNESCO draft holds that
[t]he objective of satellite broadcasting for the free flow ofinformation is to ensure the widest possible dissemination,
among the peoples of the world, of news of all countries, de-
veloped and developing alike. 79
The draft specifies that every effort should be made "to ensure
the factual accuracy of the information reaching the public."' 0
The source of the news must be identified.8' But Article V
suggests no other constraints on the dissemination of news. As
to educational programming, on the other hand, the UNESCO
draft states that "each country has the right to decide on the content
76 In the 1930's, Germany attempted to control access to foreign news
sources by distributing People's Receiving Sets capable of tuning in only nationalprograms. Similarly, in the context of direct satellite broadcasting, frequencies
could be assigned by the United Nations so that only a particular frequency band
would be beamed at a given state, which could require that sets be manufactured
to receive only the permissible band. Such an approach puts the burden on the
receiving country to screen out unwanted signals rather than putting the burden
on the carrier or the originator. Still, as to the chosen band, the state would have
authority to determine what programming could be beamed. Such an approach
would probably not be implemented on a program-by-program basis. Rather, a
state would issue an authorization to an originating source outside its borders to
employ a particular frequency to deliver programming over a period of time.A license, for example, could be issued to the BBC to use a particular frequency
radiated to portions of the Middle East.
Under this solution the problem of unintentional radiation remains. Spillover
can pose a problem of equal magnitude to purposive broadcasting. The Sovietdeclaration would require a state to enter appropriate consultations with a third-party state whose territory would be invaded through unintentional spillover. Atthe least, there should be notice to a third party state of the potential spillover,
the steps that are being taken to correct and confine it, the frequencies that will
be employed, and the content of programs that will be broadcast.
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of the educational programmes broadcast by satellite to its
people .... *"82 Where cultural programming is concerned, the
UNESCO draft seems to speak to the originating institution rather
than the receiving country: "[C]ultural programmes, while promot-
ing the enrichment of all cultures, should respect the distinctive
character, the value and the dignity of each, and the right of all
countries and peoples to preserve their cultures as part of the com-
mon heritage of mankind. '8 3  Only with respect to commercial
advertising does the draft specify that transmission "shall be subject
to specific agreement between the originating and receiving coun-
tries." 4
The UNESCO approach seems almost wholly consistent with
the first amendment as previously interpreted. The UNESCO
restrictions that may be imposed are no greater than those imposed
by the Congress on the programming supported by the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting. 5 Domestic legislation requires that
news be objective,86 a requirement somewhat more potent than that
of factual accuracy. It is possible, of course, that a court might
declare unconstitutional the objectivity requirement of the Public
Broadcasting Act. While the Supreme Court has upheld the con-
stitutionality of the fairness doctrine, the basis of the decision was
the right to hear conflicting and erroneous news.8 7 The Commis-
sion as arbiter of fairness is a far less intrusive agent than the
Commission as arbiter of truth and accuracy.
IV.
The most serious issue in direct satellite broadcasting is
whether the United States should accede to international principles
which legitimate restrictions on the content of information that
flow into the United States. When the United States stood in
splendid isolation in the United Nations it was responding to a
Soviet resolution that would have prohibited any program
detrimental to the maintenance of international peace and
security, which publicizes ideas of war, militarism, national
and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, which is
aimed at interfering in the internal domestic affairs of other
States, or which undermines the foundations of the local civ-
ilizatition [sic], culture, way of life, traditions or language.88
At first blush, these standards seem wholly incompatible with first
amendment standards. Yet, as with the national consent issue, it
will be worthwhile to examine analogous American domestic law.
82 UNESCO Draft, supra note 77, at Article VI.
83 Id. at Article VII.
84 Id. at Article IX.
85 See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1970).
86 Cf. 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 399 (1970).
87 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
88 Legal Sub-committee Report, supra note 4, Annex II, at 2. See notes
23-29 & accompanying text supra and text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
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Explicit content regulation is the crudest and least appetizing
form of assuring an acceptable flow of information. One might
expect that a powerful government born of democratic principles
would resort to more subtle methods for affecting content. The
accurate measure of freedom of expression then might not be the
overt bans, but the mechanisms that have the potential for influ-
encing content. Current regulations, recently renewed and re-
viewed, provide for FCC licensing of international broadcast sta-
tions but only if the service provided "will reflect the culture of this
country and. . . will promote international goodwill, understand-
ing and cooperation." 9  This overtly content-oriented regulation
has never been judicially challenged. The section was originally
met by the "united opposition of the industry and has been at-
tacked in Congress as being an entering wedge for censorship of
domestic programs." 90 Aside from the content-oriented standards
imposed by the FCC, the government maintains de facto control
over international broadcasting originating in the United States by
virtue of theVoice of America's virtual monopoly of frequency-
hours. 91
The regulatory agencies of a democratic government also have
substantial power to affect the flow of information by determining
how much of a scarce resource should be used for speech and
program-related activities. Given finite spectrum capacity, an
agency must allocate space and time among competing users. Thus,
the Communications Act permits the FCC to "[plrescribe the
nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed
stations,"92 even though the licensee's speech is, in a sense, inhibit-
ed thereby. A license given a station to operate in frequencies
reserved for noncommercial broadcasting means the time cannot be
used to promote products through advertising. A licensee who
holds an amateur radio station license cannot transmit business
messages.93 The courts have consistently held that such regulation
89 47 C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1973).
90 C.B. Rosa, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROADCASTING 244 (1940).
91 Under the Radio Regulations and international agreements, only a limited
number of frequency-hours are available for United States transmissions. The
Voice of America (VOA) is not licensed by the FCC; private international broad-
casters are. In the recent past, the proportionate share of frequency hours used
by the VOA has increased. Indeed, Congress resolved in the Information and
Educational Exchange Act of 1948, 22 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970), that the "Secretary
shall reduce such government information activities whenever corresponding pri-
vate information dissemination is found to be adequate .... ." Id. Despite that
injunction (or perhaps because of a lack of private applicants), VOA frequency-
hour usage has increased to about 440 frequency-hours per day while private
transmissions have decreased to about ten percent of that figure. See Interna-
tional Broadcasting Stations, 27 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1641, 1643 (1973).
92 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1970).
98 47 C.F.R. § 97.114(c) (1972).
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is permissible because of the technological limits on the availability
of radio frequencies. 4
A similar classification power has also been made in parceling
out frequencies among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The FCC and the United States government have been concerned
about possible transmitting stations located outside the United
States but directing programming at U.S. citizens. In the 1930's,
some stations that were denied licenses in the United States tried to
move their transmitters to Mexico and to receive American pro-
gramming there for rebroadcast to this country. The Commission
held that it could deny a license to a facility in the United States
whose purpose was to transmit material to such a Mexican station
for retransmission into the United States.9" "The character of the
programs likely to be arranged and transmitted from the proposed
studio does not appear to be such as would promote better interna-
tional relations or to serve the public interest .... -96 The
authority for the FCC action was section 325(b) of the Federal
Communications Act 97 which allows the Commission to control
radio transmission facilities linked to external stations seeking to
reach an American audience. Radio usage designations in the
treaties between the United States and Mexico, and the United
States and Canada, leave the implication that clear channel author-
ization was distributed so that the strongest Mexican and Canadian
stations (in terms of geographical reach) were spaced away from
the common border. 8 The direct implications of the classification
power for direct satellite broadcast are not hard to discern. Con-
sistent with the first amendment, some classes of foreign broadcasts
94 See, e.g., Gross v. FCC, 480 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95 In re T. Yount, 2 F.C.C. 200 (1935). In Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 248 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1957), ABC was applying for a waiver to
supply material to XETV, broadcasting to San Diego from Mexico. The court
said:
It is not suggested that the Federal Communications Commission has
any authority to control the content of the program which XETV chooses
to broadcast. The question is whether the Commission may consider
the character of that programming in deciding whether the public inter-
est would be served by authorizing an American network to supply its
programs to XETV. . . . We hold only that, in making [an affiliation]
. . .decision, the Commission may not altogether exclude from con-
sideration such serious defects of the foreign station's programming as
would affect the public interest.
Id. at 651.
96 2 F.C.C. at 207.
97 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (1970).
98 The United States predicated agreements with other countries in the
hemisphere upon domestic needs. The allotments of channels and classes to
Mexico place all high-powered radio stations far from the United States border.
North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, Dec. 13, 1937, 55 Stat. 1005
(1941), T.S. No. 962. See also C.B. ROSE, NATIONAL POLICY FOR RADIO BROAD-
CASTING 241 (1940).
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can be practically prevented from penetrating American borders. 99
A final and subtle regulatory device that has possibly unin-
tended content implications relates to the ownership of radio and
television stations. Section 310(a) of the Communications Act
requires that licenses for domestic radio or television stations can-
not be held by
any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien
or of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned
of record or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a
foreign government . . . or by any corporation organized
under the laws of a foreign country.' 00
The statute apparently has not been challenged on constitutional
grounds.10
Even if the original impetus for the citizenship requirement
was not Americanizing the airwaves, one must ask whether it
would be reasonable to rely on such an argument if section 3 10(a)
were attacked in -the future. The kinds of exceptions made in recent
circuit court decisions addressing citizenship classifications would
determine the scope and success of such an argument. These
decisions have carved out certain areas in which classification on
the basis of citizenship might be permitted. For example, in Jalil
v. Hampton,' a case invalidating the similar Federal Civil Service
requirements, Judge Bazelon stated that
[t]he only interest which could possibly rise to [the level of
permissible exclusion] . . . is the perceived necessity for
employing persons of undivided loyalty in policy-making posi-
tions, or positions involving national security interests.' 03
An argument could be made that the airwaves are unique and
99 For example, consistent with the first amendment, it could be determined
that a certain portion of the time allotted could be used only by governmental
transmitters of information. Or a class of content much like the classification
for the proposed Indian satellite could be established, requiring that the satellite
be used only for educational purposes.
100 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)(4) (1970).
101 For a recent discussion of the rule, see United Artists Broadcasting, Inc.,
7 P & F RADIO RFG. 2d 7 (1966). Such a requirement might possibly be chal-
lenged under recent Supreme Court decisions holding that alienage is a suspect
.classification. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973'); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); cf. Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 GEo. L.J.207 (1972); 12 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 581 (1973). But the Supreme Court
cases are not dispositive. They deal with state legislation (although it is not
clear that this should make a difference), and they admit that there is some room
permitted, on a compelling showing, for citizenship-related qualifications. One
might suppose that the section 310(a) citizenship requirement is imposed for
security reasons, or at least out of a possibly constitutionally impermissible as-
sumption that citizens are more trustworthy than aliens in the image of the United
States that they will convey.
102 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
103 id. at 930 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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that special national security considerations are involved in their
management. The need to use the radio frequencies in national
emergencies is the most obvious indication of the sensitive nature
of frequency management.
The citizenship requirement may be attacked and ultimately
found unconstitutional. But its existence, its persistence, and the
likelihood of its endurance surely results in some reduction in the
diversity of voices within the United States. If the statute is
constitutional, and if it owes its validity to national security consid-
erations, then, of course, significant implications arise for the
power of the United States to regulate incoming signals originating
abroad: The federal government could take equivalent steps to
protect national security by regulating direct broadcast messages.
Under this analysis, an American licensing procedure would be
warranted.
International content standards also evoke the continuing con-
cerns in the United States about federal censorship of broadcaster
programming. Since this ground has been well covered else-
where,' it is sufficient merely to cite certain of the relevant
doctrines. Stretched-but not too far-FCC practices and indus-
try codes speak to many of the issues covered in the content-
oriented international approach. For example, the commission
has a de facto, if not de jure, interest in broadcasts advocating or
showing violence and horrors, 10 5 pornography' 0 6 and the use of
narcotics. 10 7 Much federal regulation is geared, in theory though
not in practice, to moderating the impact of national broadcasting
on local areas, 05 though the concern has rarely been for "local
civilization culture, way of life, traditions or language."' 9  While
the FCC has not adopted the principle formally, it will sanction
licensees who "encroach on fundamental human rights, on the
dignity and worth of the human person and on fundamental free-
doms for all . . ."0 The code of the National Association of
104 See, e.g., Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the First Amend-
ment, 15 HInv. INT'L L.J. 514 (1974).
105 See, e.g., Foundation to Improve Television, 25 F.C.C.2d 830 (1970).
106 Station WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973). See also Inquiry into
Alleged Broadcasts and Cablecasts of Obscene, Indecent or Profane Material by
Licensees, Permittees, or Cable Systems, 40 F.C.C.2d 105 (1973).
107 Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 914 (1973). See Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J.
1343 (1970).
108 Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An
Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 7-8 (1968) (statement by Comm'rs K. Cox
& N. Johnson).
109 Legal Sub-committee Report, supra note 4, Annex H at 4.
110 See note 25 supra.
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Broadcasters contains a similar position.1'1 There have been ef-
forts to discipline a radio station that broadcast anti-Semitic pro-
gramming, 112 and a station that carefully excised network programs
advocating the Negro cause lost its license." 8 Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois,"4 upholding an Illinois statute that penalized group libel, may
be a crippled constitutional doctrine," 5 but it remains testimony to
the possible constitutionality of a statute that would penalize per-
sons who slander a racial or religious group.
CONCLUSION
What is the appropriate American stance with respect to inter-
national ordering of direct broadcast satellite content? Clearly, it
accords with domestic policy and with the spirit of the first amend-
ment for the United States to urge passionately an international
regime which fosters the flow of information. But it is also clear
that, as interpreted and administered, the first amendment is conso-
nant with an international scheme that classifies the spectrum
available for direct broadcast by satellite so that only particular
categories of programming could be used. The international com-
munity might determine, for example, that initially satellite fre-
quencies could be used only for educational programming. The
first amendment would not be hostile to provisions permitting each
state to adopt regulations that legitimately protect its own domestic
television system from foreign competition. Nor would the first
amendment be inconsistent with international regulation of com-
mercial messages. Certain content regulations would mirror spe-
cific or implicit constraints on American broadcast media. These
include restraints on obscenity and pornography. The extent to
which an international constraint on content would be consistent
with first amendment norms would depend on the stage, mecha-
nism and degree of sanction for the breach of an internationally set
regulation.
More severe first amendment problems would arise if the
United States is required to enforce the content regulations im-
111 But see Letter to Lonnie King, FCC 72-711 (Aug. 3, 1972) (no inter-
vention where station ran blatantly racist political advertising).
112 See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith Against Station KTYM, 4
F.C.C.2d 190 (1966), petition for reconsideration denied, 6 F.C.C.2d 385 (1967),
a! 'd, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Ad Hoc Committee on the Sugar Bowl, 29 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 70(1973); United Federation of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204 (1969). But see Letter
to Mr. Bernie Imes, Jr., FCC 65-433 (May 19, 1965), discussed at 15 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 1101 (1969). See also WBNX Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 837
(1948).
113 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
114 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
115 See H. K&LvEN, THE NEGRo AND THm FIRST AMENDMENT 37 (1965).
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posed by receiving countries and the Convention. Here, a grada-
tion of impingements can be constructed and evaluated. If the
United States Congress enacted a set of regulations restricting the
content of incoming and outgoing programs in the broad manner of
the Draft Convention, it would be clearly unconstitutional. But
suppose the Draft Convention established mandatory constraints
that are generally consistent with the first amendment and per-
mitted member states to add other restraints. The propriety of
American adherence to such an agreement might turn on the en-
forcement mechanism. To require the United States to police con-
tent restraints imposed by another country would place the govern-
ment in the position of choosing and judging programs in just the
way that the first amendment forbids. On the other hand, as has
been indicated, the current standards for licensing private entities
using international frequencies suggests that something of the
idea of comity is already at work. Finally, the proposed principles
could authorize states to establish content restraints but leave it
to each state to enforce those restraints by control over receiving
sets or bilateral and multilateral agreement. Adherence to such
an arrangement might offend the spirit of the first amendment since
it legitimates some constraints imposed by some states.
In a sense, the portion of the proposed principles that is most
hostile to the first amendment involves the automatic constraints on
material that, in the American context, would 'be characterized as
involving national security. Ideas and .information that are un-
settling, that are hostile to the reigning regime are the very ideas
that the first amendment was designed to protect. As the Draft
Convention is now phrased, the United States would be adhering to
an agreement that prevented foreign senders from sending mes-
sages to Americans that might be considered subversive by the
government. Such an agreement would almost certainly infringe
tod substantially on first amendment rights and could not be
justified by a legitimate federal interest. In no case has the Su-
preme Court indicated that the first amendment would brook a
curb on incoming information where that curb was directed at the
political or ideological content of the material. In that re-
spect, television and radio are on an equal plane with other media.
All this is to say that in the structuring of an international
order for regulating direct satellite broadcasts our domestic law,
including the first amendment, allows some play but has its areas
of somewhat abused rigidity. International control that classifies,
that protects existing distributors of information, that shelters
young viewers from obscene programming, that selects among
competing applicants on the basis of merit-all this can dwell in
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the tent of the first amendment. But heavy-handed censorship will
not work where there is a specific content control that touches
upon ideas relevant to the political structure of the state and its
relationship to other states. That is the heart of the first amend-
ment. If the international community is to institute such restric-
tions on the free flow of information, it must not ask the United
States to enforce the rule.
